

# Afkar<sup>tashwirul</sup>

JOURNAL ON REFLECTION OF RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL THOUGHT

## NAHDLATUL ULAMA *and* Transformation of Indonesian ISLAM



---

## AN INTELLECTUAL, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE: The Portrait of the Latest Five Years Nahdlatul Ulama\*

Syafiq Hasyim

For about the latest five years, three major points – in different proportion – have colored the life of the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), these are an intellectual, civil society, and political discourse. The first of two discourses, an intellectual and civil society, have become the mainstream issues in NU after *Khittah* 1926. During Abdurrahman Wahid's leadership for three periods in NU (1984-1999), has given the significant contributions to develop two discourses above. The first of two periods of Wahid's (1984-1999), NU has succeeded to create the most brilliant period in the history of NU in developing an intellectual and civil society discourses. The involvement of NU activists and intellectuals in pro-democracy and civil rights movements, the emergence of Non-governmental Organizations (NGO), civil rights networks, and the awakening of *pesantrens* in civil society works, set an example the success of NU in advocating an intellectual and civil society movement. This development at the time, was influenced by a leadership model of Gus Dur, who has led with criticism and non-compromised.<sup>1</sup>

---

\* Translated by Husnul Qadim and edited by Ala'i Najib

<sup>1</sup> Martin gives the term of "non-compromised" for Gus Dur's attitude in the early periods of his leadership in NU. According to Martin, Wahid is a meritorious person behind the effort that involved *pesantren* in community development by networking those *pesantrens* with Non-Governmental Organizations, whether inside or outside the country. See Martin Van Bruinessen, "Indonesia's Ulama and Politics: Caught between Legitimizing the Status Quo and Searching for Alternatives", Prisma—The Indo-



It is appropriate to the situation of NU at the time, in which NU was left and marginalized<sup>2</sup> especially in economic, politics, and education field. With this model, Gus Dur has offered a hope and a new identity for *Nahdliyin* community by an intellectual and civil society development.

However, two discourses above have increased with mutual accord to political development in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto's regime, 1998. At the beginning, NU has concentrated in intellectual and civil society agendas, but since Suharto's regime fall, NU has rethought to take a side in politics practice. Probably, it occurred because of the political condition of the state that supports it, such as the reformation and the openness in every field of lives. Although some peoples in the NU circle have been disappointed with the idea of back to politics, PBNU persisted to found the political party, the National Awakening Party, *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB). As consequence, PKB has made NU deeply involves in the problems of politics practice, because PBNU claimed

PKB as the only one political party, which was founded by PBNU. Another party out of PKB was not legitimacy as NU's party.<sup>3</sup>

On the "talkshow" program in TPI (one of TV stations in Indonesia), close to the election of 1999, KH. Abdurrahman Wahid stated the controversial statement about the relationship among the parties that based on NU, because there were about more then three parties, which were identified their selves as NU's party. Gus Dur has given an analogy that some political parties around NU are similar to something comes out from the bottom of chicken. In his mind, PKB is the same as an egg, and another parties are the same as chicken droppings. Nevertheless the statement was purposed to strengthen the political position of PKB among the NU's community, the statemen has made some controversies.

It is significant to describe the PKB formation. Because, since the emergence of PKB, problems were related to NU and politics happen up until nowadays. In brief, the political portion, for about 5-6 years,-

---

nesian Indicator (Jakarta), No.49 (1990), 52-69. Or see [http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruneseen/personal/publications/Ulama\\_and\\_politics.htm](http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruneseen/personal/publications/Ulama_and_politics.htm).

<sup>2</sup> The term "left and marginalized" contains an element of deliberateness (not natural), in which the last government, especially under Suharto's regime, NU was intentionally treat like a stepchild by government. As the biggest religious organization in Indonesia, NU was possibly regarded as the power threatens, so its existence should be dwarfed.

<sup>3</sup> On the "talkshow" program in TPI (one of TV stations in Indonesia), close to the election of 1999, KH. Abdurrahman Wahid stated the controversial statement about the relationship among the parties that based on NU, because there were about more then three parties, which were identified their selves as NU's party. Gus Dur has given an analogy that some political parties around NU are similar to something comes out from the bottom of chicken. In his mind, PKB is the same as an egg, and another parties are the same as chicken droppings. Nevertheless the statement was purposed to strengthen the political position of PKB among the NU's community, the statemen has made some controversies.

since the emergence of the PKB and the era of Gus Dur's president- has been as mainstream issues of NU that defeat two major discourses before.

This article will report NU in the latest five years through three points of view. Firstly, an intellectual discourse, (how does an intellectual discourse develop in the latest five years of the NU). Secondly, a civil society discourse, (how is the condition of civil society in the NU, growing up or down?). Thirdly, a politics, (how does the NU institutionally response a politics practice, especially related to the *khittah* '26?).

### An Intellectual Discourse

The term of an intellectual discourse in NU, means all issues and activities that were purposed as a representation of the intellectual development around NU, especially for the latest five years. Therefore, the calculation of this description will start from the NU congress of XXX (Muktamar NU XXX) at 1999 in Kediri. The congress has played a significant role for the progress of NU later, because the congress was the beginning period of change. On the leadership side, the leader has changed in this congress, from KH. Abdurrahman Wahid to KH. Hasyim Muzadi. The difference of figure, of course, it will differ a leadership model. On the politics side, it has changed from not existing of the po-

litical element to existing of the political element in NU, such as PKB (a party of politic). The existing of PKB, of course, will make a different situation in the period of KH. Hasyim Muzadi.

Before the NU congress in Kediri at 1999, rumors about a figure who would be the best leader of NU after KH. Abdurrahman Wahid, has spread around the two figures,<sup>4</sup> they were KH. Hasyim Muzadi and KH. Said Agiel Siradj. Both of them were close to Gus Dur. Hasyim Muzadi has given a protection and support for Gus Dur in Cipasung Congress (Muktamar Cipasung). In addition, Said Agiel Siradj is an alumnus of one University in Madina, who was promoted by Gus Dur. It is the appreciation, which another one has not ever accepted. At the time, the NU's community concerning to these two figures imagined two possibilities. If Hasyim led NU, NU will be led in a good management because Hasyim was known as a leader of NU at province level, who has succeeded to develop NU in a good management image. It is the capability, as far as we have heard about Hasyim. If Said Agiel Siradj led, NU will get fresh cadre of intellectuality. At that time, he has promised that he will send a thousand of NU's young generations to study abroad every year.

In consequence of Said Agiel's speech

<sup>4</sup> In fact, there were two others figure outside of both of them, who placed as candidates. They were Salahudin Wahid (Gus Salah) and Ahmad Bagdja. Gus Salah hasn't found a big support, because some peoples suspect him as "infiltrator" candidate from ICMI considering this figure's intimacy to the ICMI circle. While Ahmad Bagdja, who hopes to get votes from the West of Java, was lost in popularity by Said Agiel, who gets votes from the West of Java also.





Lakpesdam

as a chief of congress committee was not so sympathetic, as if he is shifting an old tradition in NU, and a deep criticism from Gus Dur which at the time was being an Indonesian President. All these phenomena made Hasyim Muzadi won the biggest votes from congress participants.

The winning of Hasyim Muzadi was gladly accepted by all element of NU because his leadership model was regarded as the best choice for continuing Gus Dur's model. It means his managerial aspect that was needed from Hasyim Muzadi's leadership. A good manager who would be able increases an intellectual discourse of NU more progress than before. This aspect was expected from Hasyim Muzadi's winning, in the view that an intellectual aspect around NU has sig-

nificantly increased in Gus Dur's period.

This hope was too far to be charged against KH.Hasyim Muzadi's leadership. If we realized that a new leader would have a new model and differ from a previous leader, Gus Dur. Developing of an intellectual discourse needs a leader with strong capability in this field, whereas the prominent capability of Hasyim Muzadi was not in his intellectual side but in his managerial side. On the other hand, the development of an intellectual discourse, which was provided by Gus Dur, actually is still going elite and limited on the young circle of NU in the cities; specifically it is centered in Jakarta. Although Hasyim Muzadi has had an access to its prominent figures, but he needs a long time to develop this circle network cause of his stay in the East of

Java. Whatever, there is no impossibility for doing all the hopes.

A good capital in the development of an intellectual discourse that have been done by Gus Dur, was really enough to be increased again more progressively by the leader after. However, at the same time, the changing of leadership in NU, and euphoria of political power related to Gus Dur's presidency happened in NU. It made all the energy of the NU was mobilized to maintain it.

In the end of Gus Dur's leadership in NU, an intellectual discourse of NU has been ever enliven with the importance of reinterpreting the meaning of *Ahlussunnah Wa al-Jama'ah*), then this matter has been defeated by a political problem which was having a higher acceptability around NU. As we known that Gus Dur's controversies as president made not only PKB tried to explain Gus Dur's statements, conducts, and policies; but also NU involved. In this context, Hasyim has started to involve to the political problems, which should not be involved. However, Hasyim Muzadi's efforts for involving on this arena can be tolerated either personally or institutionally. Personally, Gus Dur's role on the electing of Hasyim, as the chair of PBNU (the board center of the NU), was too big, so it was proper if Hasyim has involved supporting Gus Dur. Institution-

ally, though NU was not political party, but at least NU can give moral support for Gus Dur's when in trouble. This political problems and the snare of KH.Hasyim Muzadi for playing on this arena affected at intellectual movement around NU, even can be told as "decline" if it compared by epochs before all.

After the fall of Gus Dur, the new of NU leadership actually can use the time back to consolidate an intellectuality of NU after two years vacuum as the result of NU attention, which was concentrated to Gus Dur's presidency. Unhappily, Hasyim Muzadi was trapped again in the wallow of politics when he has had to join in solving of internal conflicts in the party, which was founded by NU.<sup>5</sup> Possibly, Hasyim Muzadi's choice for joining in the drama conflicts of PKB was only kind of moral action. However, Hasyim Muzadi actually would not be involved, if he refused to handle a conflict of PKB. As the consequence, the aid for solving the conflict of PKB, which he offered, was perceived by the circle of PKB for legitimating of Matori desertion. The meetings between Hasyim Muzadi and Matori, which has made the atmosphere turbid, proved it. Hasyim Muzadi was deeply trapped in political business, and the agenda of an intellectual discourse development would be forgotten again.

<sup>5</sup> After SI (special conference of MPR) shifted down Gus Dur at 2001, PKB has split up because of desertion, which was done by Matori Abdul Jalil. PKB has been separated in two fortifications, PKB Kuningan (which was blessed by Gus Dur) and PKB Batu Tulis (which was led by Matori).



Factually, the role of an intellectual development is not only the responsibility of the “*Tanfidziyah*” (Executive council) leader, but also the responsibility of “*Syuriyah*” (Supreme council or deliberation council) leader as the high-level institution in NU. As known, that NU is the religious organization based on agrarian and having a high paternalistic pattern, so an initiative of an intellectual discourse development, which would be started from an elite group of NU, would be very important and effective. Because the mobilization from an elite level did not emerge, hence it can be told that an intellectual discourse in the NU was not too conspicuous; even it has experienced a big decline if compared with periods before.

As consideration for this view, when NU was led by Abdurrahman Wahid, the mobilization of an intellectual discourse in NU was felt its impact. This figure has successfully applied his power to mobilize important issues related to Islam, politics, and human right to be expostulated intensively and extended around the NU. Some important issues were offered such as “*pribumisasi*” (Indigenous Islam), respecting to minority rights, democratization, and many else. Though by some of the NU citizens, the ideas that were expressed by Gus Dur, were not acceptable – even were opposed, but at least they who did not accept and oppose, review and looked for an ar-

gument why they could not receive and oppose. It was a good process, because in this process an intellectual dialog happened.

In period of KHM. Sahal Mahfudz and Hasyim Muzadi’s leadership, such as this event scarcely occur, even it could not be found by “*nahdliyin*” (the NU community). Sahal Mahfudz factually have an intellectual high reputation, but as result of his carefulness no to create controversy, hence he mostly choose to keep silent. Although, he have a brilliant idea concerning the importance of Islamic law reform (“*fiqih sosial*”), cause of his smooth feeling, Sahal Mahfudh prefer to express his idea to limited audiences as college groups.<sup>6</sup> He did not use his high-level authority – either as a Moslem scholar or as “Rais Am Syuriyah NU” (a chair of deliberation council of NU) – to extend the ideas widely around the Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School). Whereas, Hasyim Muzadi, which his intellectual authority can not be compared to Gus Dur’s, did not propose new ideas in Islamic intellectual discourses at all. He is merely a pure activist.

Actually, Hasyim could cover up his weakness by an alliance with an intellectual circle of NU, which has arisen and existed in non-structural line of NU such as non-governmental organization groups of NU in Jakarta, Yogyakarta or another places. Unhappily, as long as his leader-

<sup>6</sup> Sahal Mahfudz recently has received an academic title of *Doctor Honoris Causa* from Islamic State University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta with an inauguration speech topic of “*Fiqih Sosial: Upaya Pengembangan Madzhab Qauli dan Manhaji*”.

ship, Hasyim's relationship with these groups is not so strong. Possibly, Hasyim has another view that the alliance with non-structural groups was not strategic to develop this institution considering of different period. Besides, it is impressed that Hasyim seems to achieve NU as different as Gus Dur's leadership, which Gus Dur's leadership mostly has taken care of the NU's groups in cultural line. Hasyim did not realize that the awakening of the NU intellectuality cannot expect from the structural functionary of NU, because the structural functionary usually has more activities in organizational business and politics lobbies, and any else.

Nevertheless, during Hasyim's period, there were two important events related to an intellectual discourse development in NU. Firstly was a congress of thought, which was carried out by the alliance of young intellectual groups of NU in *Pesantren Situbondo*. Even though, it faced defiance from another cultural young intellectual groups of NU,<sup>7</sup> but this congress of thought was a good event to recollect an intellectual effort, which has been developed by this

organization in few periods before. Second event was an international conference under the topic of "*Islam Sebagai Rahmatan li al-'Alamin*" was held in Jakarta.<sup>8</sup> This conference actually got full facility from the Overseas Department of RI. This support is not only for the NU but also for the Muhammadiyah organization. The Muhammadiyah will carry out the international conference around the first December 2004. If we see this fact, it is a kind of allocation for each big organization.

The conference with a full support from Megawati regime is useful to strengthen again the networking efforts to the international level, which have done in the period of Gus Dur. Whatever, celebrating of both important events above cannot be as a reason for claiming that the NU has experienced more progressive development if compared to periods before.

### Civil Society

Civil Society (CS) is another aspect will be analyzed in this writing from NU for the latest five years. We almost could not deny that the contribution of CS groups

<sup>7</sup> The defiance impression of Yogyakarta group (LKIS) to the congress of thought was shown from Mukhotib article, which was published by the daily of *Kompas*, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2003, under the topic of "*Sesat Pikir Mukhtamar Pemikiran*" (an errant thought of the congress of thoughts). The assessment to this congress of thought is rather limited because at the time of the congress was held, the writer was following *Fellowship in East-West Center Hawaii*, United States, and so he could not follow the process of the congress program. The disagreement of young intellectual and activist in Yogyakarta, especially which was motored by LKIS, was shown from the absence in the congress.

<sup>8</sup> This conference actually got full facility from the Overseas Department of RI. This support is not only for the NU but also for the Muhammadiyah organization. The Muhammadiyah will carry out the international conference around the first December 2004. If we see this fact, it is a kind of allocation for each big organization.



for the NU's growth is very big until nowadays. The NU image has incisively changed after for a long period stayed in "negative"<sup>9</sup> image because of the politic activities in some periods ago. During mid of eight tens and nine tens, this organization has push the appearance of some groups in the public to create "a public sphere". The decade of eight tens and nine tens is a term of necessary for these groups existence, where at this period Civil Soecity groups in NU have started to make an interaction with another same groups out of NU. Gus Dur's alliance with pro-democracy groups has assisted hardly for young activists and intellectuals in NU to discuss and cooperate with critical groups out side of NU. As we have known, secular groups mostly dominated in those critical groups at that time. As consequence of the merge of NU's Civil Society groups into their circle actually have assisted them, especially in the recognition of the religious issues, and through NU democracy issues and human rights ideas can be transformed further to the religious groups around NU, specifically for around the *Pesantren*.

At five the last years (1999-2004), institutionally, the role of NU in the civil society development continues, but the intensity cannot be told to exceed out of three periods before. Some points were differen-

tiating this period and period before. *Firstly*, NU in the reformation era has faced the political situation, which was different with the situation of NU leadership era at periods before. At five years later, moreover the impact of Gus Dur's presidency, the existence of NU was being very important to be paid attention. The organization based on traditional mass with the tendency of submissive to their leader, was being considered by the power elite and the party for the direct election system. This political situation was also supported by realistic and pragmatic orientation of leadership model in the NU. The unity between this political situation and a pragmatic leadership orientation bring the NU choose a pragmatic orientation too.

*Secondly*, the situation of the structural NU it self did not express a clear paradigm about civil society development. What I mean with a clear paradigm of civil society development is availability the concept of a public development model, which was expected, and partying to *nahdliyin* (the NU citizens). Rhetorically, the structural NU still has a strong desire to develop civil societ in their community. Nevertheless, the implication of an equivocal concept of civil society, made NU seem to disregard the civil society development. It differs from the civil society development model at Gus Dur's

<sup>9</sup> This organization has all kinds of image as result of the role, which has done. Some images for instance are the NU as the organization of groups with sarong - religious traditional cloth - (rural and conservative image), opportunist (image of gaining profit), image at status quo side, and any else. See Greg Fealy, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama*, (LKIS: Yogyakarta, 2003).

leadership era, where Gus Dur systematically and continually put down NU as the strength outside the state. Not only as the strength outside the state, Gus Dur also tried to create NU as different as other social and religious organizations, which were sponsored by the state such as ICMI. Theoretically, what Gus Dur has done, can be told as negative school of civil society development model.<sup>10</sup> Hasyim's leadership seemingly put down NU in "gray" position. It means, whether NU was put down as the strength outside the state or being the compromise strength. It is possible that NU leadership in Hasyim Muzadi's era has an agenda to place NU in the middle: that is between being compromise and being oppositions. That way was actually ideal, because it made NU as neutral strength. Nevertheless, if this choice is not done maximally; it will easily derail the NU into opportunist position. What has occurred in NU at the latest five years, truly strengthen again an opportunist image of NU.

Probably, the paradigm of civil society development in Hasyim's period refers to Hegelian approach. Depend on Hegel, the civil society strength does not always mean existing outside the state. This strength can support the state, because the state is not



Lakpesdam

negative strength.<sup>11</sup> It means NU's position does not forbid for cooperating with the strength of state. Yet, because Hasyim did not give an explicit concept about the paradigm of civil society development, it was impressed that Hasyim was standing at unclear position in the context of civil society development in NU. Whereas, the clarity of paradigm for civil society empowerment is vital to be expressed to the NU public because Gus Dur has organized the public during approximately of fifteen years systematically for positioning them as the strength outside the state. This view was strong in the mind of the NU public. Therefore, the coming of Hasyim, which led the NU with the difference of Gus Dur's paradigm and without strong clarification, has made the resistance or at least his leadership is not legitimate, because in their mind

<sup>10</sup> A negative school of civil society development is based on model of civil society development, which refers to Marxism school, where civil society group cannot exist inside of the state. As control strength, civil society group should be outside the State strength. See, Jean L. Cohen, *Class and civil society: the Limit of Marxian Critical Theory*, (University of Massachusetts Press: Amherst, 1982), especially chapter I, "Civil Society and its Discontents".

<sup>11</sup> This is called as a positive school in civil society development, which refers to Hegel. See at the same chapter in Jean L. Cohen book.



the right of civil society empowering is model as Gus Dur's model.

One of other factor that has made civil society movement has declined, is cause of many energy of NU has been concerned into formal politic movements, not only with the NU's parties but also with other parties such as PDIP and Golkar Party. Activities at one the last year related to the nomination of Hasyim as being vice president in coupled with Megawati, have a big implication in the NU movement. In spite of using personal reason, by the reason that institutionally NU did not legitimize it, but unavoidably this nomination has entangled NU organizationally to back up Hasyim. This reality produces any suspicions that Hasyim was politicking NU under his capacity as the formal leader of PBNU. However, inactive position, in the field reality, Hasyim and his team success has truly used NU citizens as the target. This vice president nominating is not civil society work but as politic work. So, in the time less than one the last year, the institution of NU was used for political works. Thereby, civil society works are dropped behind.

In spite of that, the NU involvement in , civil society movement at five years later does not loose at all. This movement was mostly pioneered by a cultural wing in NU, for instances LKiS Yogyakarta, P3M Jakarta, eLSAD Surabaya, "Lakspesdam NU" and all its branches in Indonesia, Fahmina Institute Cirebon, Sarikat Yogyakarta, Wahid Institute, Puan Amal Hayati, and many else, are the examples of non-structural of NU.<sup>12</sup> Since the electing of Hasyim as the chair of PBNU, a cultural wing of NU seemly has not involved to communicate formally with the structural functionary of NU. At the same time, the structural functionary its self impressively has closed the communication with a cultural groups network. If we might regret, this point actually required to be taken care by Hasyim Muzadi, but Hasyim has not done it.<sup>13</sup>

### Politics

There is no more thing that was extracted the energy of NU functionary at the latest five years except the political problems. According to my notes, two important problems that resulted of why these problems have happened. *Firstly*, the mat-

---

<sup>12</sup> Beside the institutions, which have a close ideology with the NU, civil society movement was also backed up by activists of the NU, which were spread in any institutions that are not related to the NU. Lakspesdam NU has a significant role to meet those all networks.

<sup>13</sup> The closed of Hasyim to these groups, for example at the time when these groups, which were gathered in the network of "Islam and Civil Society Organization", tried to get the moral support from Hasyim Muzadi as the chair of PBNU for supporting these group activities to oppose and deny "Iraq and US war". Yet, these groups have not succeeded to meet him though according to his personal secretary that it was allocated the time for these groups.

ter related to the founding of National Awakening Party (PKB). The NU congress of XXX (Muktamar 30), even though it does not explicitly mention the name of PKB, the congress has recommended that the NU community should back up the party, which was founded by NU and related history to NU. Of course, the point of recommendation means PKB. The emergence of recommendation is not only related to the election of 2004, but also related to the safety supporting of Gus Dur's presidency. Gus Dur's presidency should be fully backed up from PKB, because only its party is as the main capital of Gus Dur. Through the biggest forum and respectful in NU tradition – as the congress – the NU citizen was symbolically informed that their representatives in DPR (Indonesian Legislative Assembly) and MPR (The people' Advisory Assembly) have to back up Gus Dur. If a betrayal occurred from parliament members, they would get the punishment not only from the party leaders, but also from their voters all. Cause of this recommendation also, NU –though it is not political institution – was tied to back up of Gus Dur's presidency.

Such as this situation made some political complications, which was confusing for the NU functionaries in the period of Hasyim Muzadi. It should be confessed, that Hasyim has inherited very complicated politics situation after Gus Dur, which is vaguely situation between an asserting to Khittah<sup>26</sup> and the political power. At the time of Gus Dur as a president, the effectiveness of the NU compliance to the congress recommendation was

still can be expected. At the time, it has not forgotten that many groups have gotten an advantage morally and materially, includes an elite group of NU from Gus Dur's presidency. In consequence, as the reward is a full support for Gus Dur. The displacement of Gus Dur from the presidency palace made the situation changed. NU, which in the beginning has supported Gus Dur fully, tries slowly to draw its support with its neutrality reason from Gus Dur's fate, which was replaced. It is clear, Hasyim Muzadi's ambiguity was apparent when he faced the split of an internal PKB; between PKB led by Alwi Shihab and PKB led by Matori Abdul Jalil. Gus Dur's side wanted Hasyim explicitly recognized Alwi's PKB as one of formal party of NU, but Hasyim did not response this demand. In conclusion, Hasyim was difficult to be a free from the politics power.

Secondly is the weakness of The NU leadership after Gus Dur. The basic weakness of Hasyim Muzadi's leadership in NU is in his vision and mission management of organization. Whereas at this expertise, the biggest mandate, was expected from Hasyim's leadership at the latest five years. As we known that a dominant factor has supported the winning of Hasyim as a structural leader of PBNU at the congress 1999 in Kediri, was as the result of at the congress moment has impressed that Hasyim is "skilled of management organization" with the evidence of his success in managing NU at the East Java province. It was expected that Hasyim could arrange the PBNU management better, because the weakness of the NU at the time



is management aspect. Yet, some people thought that Hasyim is more suitable to lead PKB than NU. This view was based on his "track record", who had ever been activist of PPP and his strong tendency for politics. Nevertheless, at the time, PKB had have Matori Abdul Jalil and his leadership was not bad, so there was no strong reason for replacing him.

For five years of Hasyim's leadership, vision, mission, and orientation of NU organization was not seen, whether NU will be oriented for civic empowering works that used non-politic ways or empowering NU with politic ways. It expressed Hasyim's uncertainty. On one side, he like to develop civic empowering works, but on the other side, these efforts were carried out in his political interest. Hasyim and his supporters were still influenced by an imagination of the old activist of NU, who has a political mindset that NU should have the role in the political matters and the state.<sup>14</sup> In every speech, Hasyim's campaign teams from NU always use that imagination as material of campaign. "Why should choose Hasyim, because Hasyim who mostly give a hope for secure and prosperous the NU's citizen and only Hasyim who will represent NU's interests". However, the material of campaign is very superficial, but it impressively affirmed Hasyim in a mobilization of NU as the strength of politics.

Thirdly is the uncertainty of the interpretation of *Khittah* 1926. Institutionally, *Khittah* '26 has an ability to confine NU from a politics practice movement, but this *Khittah* has no an ability to confine the members or the functionaries of NU not doing politics. One weakness of *Khittah* '26 is caused of not existing the rule, which can confine the members or the functionaries of NU not to involve politics practice. This problem caused some critics and complaints from many circle of NU later. The functionaries of NU, who have strong tendency of politics, used this gap to legitimize their conducts. The old rule that was made, was difficult to be implemented by some groups. In the name of personal reason, adequately with non-active way, the functionary of NU can do his politics activity. It was impressed that NU was just as "stepping stone" for the next politics process. However, the point should be reflected that something was not possible if someone will be nominated by a certain group as a parliament member or president without calculating of basis mass from someone who will be nominated". In the context of the NU's candidates, especially Hasyim Muzadi, it was very difficult to be imagined that he will be nominated as a vice president in the election of 2004 ago, without using his strategic position in NU.

In the fact, the written criticism, which was sent to the present leadership of NU

<sup>14</sup> About an interested description to see how far is a political imagination of the NU activists, who arrange non-politic organization was being politic, is in Greg Fealy book, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama*.

cause of its politics tendency, has been expressed by many groups, whether from inside or outside of NU. However, this criticism cannot eliminate a political ambition of the functionaries of PBNU not to involve a politics practice. Even, from the political rhetoric that was used by political groups in NU, impressively they disregard all the criticism which was directed to them, so the response from disagree groups was also being harder. To response the firmness of PBNU politician, a young group, who gathered in the line of the cultural NU, founded the alliance of *Khittah'26* enforcer. This alliance held any activities such as lobbying and seminars which were purposed to criticize the transparent of politicization mainstream in NU. One of biggest event is a big conference of NU citizen (Musyawarah Besar Warga NU) which was held at the complex of Pesantren Babakan Cirebon in the beginning of October 2004 ago. Although it produced a remarkable complaint from the functionaries of PBNU because of the rumors about this conference as contesting of the congress of the NU XXXI in Solo, but this conference has done successful and fluent. Thousands of participants of the conference, who were most of them from non-structural circle of the NU, came from any regions to discuss the fate of NU in the latest five years. The most important point from this event is the citizens of NU have a forum that can be made as criticism to the formal leadership of NU, where for

a long time their aspiration was cut and distorted by the formal functionary.

### The Final Note

The situation of the latest five years was enough to give us description, where the best choice should be taken by the NU for the next future. Becoming NU, as the political strength, as happening at the latest five years, was not a correct choice for NU, because this way made NU as organization was siding. The pluralism of political orientations at citizen of NU was gelded by this politicization effort. For the next future, beside the need for doing a review to concept of *Khittah'26* – specifically concerning problem of the NU neutrality, NU should think mechanism of control for organization if there is plan for returning *Syuriyah* supremacy. Thereby, after a congress and a new leader was chosen, the citizens of NU have a tool (channel) to criticize simultaneously to the functionary of NU – whether *Syuriyah* or *Tanfidziyah*. Expected there is a kind of supervisor institution – ethic council or any of the names – was commissioned to control *Syuriyah* and *Tanfidziyyah*. For anticipating, under all circumstances both of these institutions are very possible to fall in mistake. In consequence, the citizens of the NU, who have chosen through each their representatives, have rights full to control them. This point is very important to do for relating again the relationship of NU with its citizens. ❖





The various steps Islam has taken through the Indonesian nation's history are characterized by the proselytizing of religiosity, society, economy and politics. Therefore, Islam in Indonesia will always be linked to the wider social, economic, and political aspects that face the Indonesian nation. With so many variants, Islamic groups in Indonesia compete for social positioning, social-capital, authority, and social-legitimacy. No wonder, historically, the Islamic movement in Indonesia has never been in agreement as a religious, social, economic, and political power. Indonesian Islam diversified in ways that were influenced by history and social-political conditions in global, national, and local settings. The growth of Indonesian Islam in this frame produced diversity in thought, perspective, faith, attitude, and platform.

